Tax Policy, Investment, and Profit Shifting
A model with heterogeneous fixed and variable costs reconciles micro and macro estimates of profit shifting and evaluates the effects of international tax reforms.
Public finance economist
I study how corporate taxation shapes firm behavior, economic activity, and the effectiveness of public policy.
I am the Lars Peter Hansen Associate Professor of Economics and Statistics at Utah State University's Jon M. Huntsman School of Business.
I am also a Faculty Research Fellow in the NBER Public Economics Program, an International Research Fellow at the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, and a Research Affiliate at CEPR and CESifo.
Since January 2025, I have served as Editor-in-Chief of International Tax and Public Finance. I received my DPhil from the University of Oxford and Nuffield College in 2017.
Selected work
Work on tax avoidance, corporate responses to policy, and the measurement of firm activity.
A model with heterogeneous fixed and variable costs reconciles micro and macro estimates of profit shifting and evaluates the effects of international tax reforms.
Comparable administrative data from sixteen countries reveal substantial cross-country variation in how firms respond to corporate tax incentives.
Firms exposed in offshore data leaks adjust governance, dividends, and tax-haven presence, while their effective tax rates remain unchanged.
The UK's worldwide debt cap prompted affected multinationals to reallocate employees abroad, with uneven consequences across local labor markets.
A dynamic firm model quantifies output losses created by unequal tax treatment of corporations and pass-through entities.
Multinationals affected by the reform moved debt and a share of real operations away from the UK.
Global patent data reveal the scale of tax-haven ownership and the role of firms potentially affected by the global minimum tax.
UK multinationals expanded their asset base while contributing a declining share of corporate tax revenue between 2000 and 2014.
Investors responded positively to the UK's worldwide debt cap, particularly for firms with weaker prior governance.
Canadian tax reforms show that cash-flow availability matters more for firm investment than temporary changes in the cost of capital.
Corruption changes firms' profit-shifting costs and reduces the revenue gains governments can achieve through higher tax rates.
Foreign multinational subsidiaries report substantially lower taxable profits than comparable domestic firms, driven largely by a higher incidence of zero-profit reporting.
More generous loss-offset rules magnify the asymmetry of corporate tax revenue responses between booms and recessions.
Evidence from 565 agreements shows that tax havens tend to exchange information with countries to which they have stronger economic ties.
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